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ON "DIVINE SIMPLICITY: A NEW DEFENSE" 
Barry Miller 
I have two criticisms of Vallicella's "Divine Simplicity: A New Defense." 
One is that its argument for property self-exemplification fails because it 
ignores the distinction between "what" clauses employing first-level quanti-
fication and those employing second-level quantification. The second criti-
cism is that his rejection of logically simple propositions stems from a failure 
to see that the argument for those propositions is based on a logical premiss, 
not a grammatical one. 
Although I am as ready to defend the divine simplicity as is William Val-
licella, I fear that, both in the body of his "Divine Simplicity: A New De-
fense"! and in its Appendix, there are misunderstandings that do not help our 
common cause. 
No First-Level Property can be Self-exemplifying 
In the body of the article Valli cella claims that some of the problems con-
fronting the doctrine of divine simplicity stem from "the plausible assumption 
that a categorial chasm divides properties and individuals such that, neces-
sarily, no property is an individual." His attempted solution is to deny that 
there is any such chasm, since in fact "some properties are identical with 
individuals" (p. 512), namely, those propositions "whose self-exemplification 
entails its identity with an individual." (p. 514) On this view, God's attributes 
would be properties of precisely that kind, and thus could rightly be said to 
be identical with him. Against this I shall argue that no first-level properties 
at all can be self-exemplifying, neither Vallicella's putative examples nor any 
others either. 
To say that a first-level property is self-exemplifying is to say that it is a 
property of itself. But, since a property of a first-level property is a second-
level property, this amounts to saying that a self-exemplifying first-level 
property is both a first- and a second-level property. Vallicella is undisturbed 
by this consequence, for his alleged examples of self-exemplifying properties 
lead him to conclude that "first- and second-level properties do not form 
mutually disjoint classes." (p. 517) Indeed, the properties of existence, self-
identity, being a property, being self-exemplified, and being extended are all 
said to be self-exemplifying, for "existence exists, self-identity is self-iden-
tical, etc." (p. 514) 
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From what he says in the preceding quotation, it is safe to conclude that 
each of the following propositions would be regarded as an expression of 
property self-exemplification: 
"Existence exists" 
"Self-identity is self-identical" 
"Being a property is a property" 
"Being self-exemplified is self-exemplified" 
"Being unextended is unextended" 
"Being inanimate is inanimate" 
As we shall see, no one of these propositions is an example of self-predica-
tion, nor therefore can any of them be an expression of property self-exem-
plification. 
I begin by noting that each of the examples is of the form "Being F is F," 
and that for "being F" we can always substitute "what ' ___ is F' stands 
for," with the result that the "Being F is F" becomes "What '~s F' stands 
for is F" Now, it is impossible to determine whether the second occurrence 
of "is F" functions as a predicate, unless we first attend to the ambiguity in 
the logical status of "what" expressions, as illustrated by "He became what 
his father had been before him" on the one hand and by "He rejected what I 
brought him" on the other. Each proposition invites the same query, "And 
what was that?" In the first case the answer might be "a writer;" in the second 
case it might be "a book." Thus far there might seem to be no logical differ-
ence between them. A difference does emerge, however, when we try to 
pursue our enquiries by asking the further question, "And which one was 
that?" In the first case there can be no answer, for there is no writer that a 
son and his father both are. In the second case there is an answer, e.g. 
"Wuthering Heights." The difference between the two "what" expressions, 
therefore, is that the first employs second-level quantification (quantification 
over properties) whereas the second employs first-level quantification (quan-
tification over objects). 
Dummett2 has reminded us that we ought not be surprised by such ambi-
guity, for it occurs also in the everyday expressions "something" and "every-
thing," each of which may involve either first-level or second-level 
quantification. In "There is something that Tom and Mary both train," our 
understanding of "something" depends on the appropriate answer to "What 
is it that they both train?" In one case it may be "Fido." But, if there is no 
one dog that they both train, it could be simply "dogs." In the first case the 
use of "something" would involve first-level quantification; in the second 
case the quantification would be second-level. Further examples of second-
level quantification are "Unhappy is what all Rumanians seem to be" and 
"Underpaid is what Peter does not want to be."3 The gaps in " is what 
all Rumanians seem to be" and in " is what Peter does not want to be" 
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are to be filled not by a singular term, nor even by a first-level predicate, but 
by a first-level predicable.4 For just that reason, the logical form of these 
propositions is not one of singular termllst-Ievel predicate, but of 1 st-Ievel 
predicable/2nd-level predicate. 
What now are we to say about the logical form of Vallicella's examples, 
all of which can properly be understood as "What ' ___ is F' stands for is 
F," e.g. "What ' ___ exists' stands for exists" and "What ' ___ is a prop-
erty' stands for is a property?" It might have been tempting to think that the 
second "is F" is being predicated of the referent of "what ' ___ is F' stands 
for," i.e. that the proposition's logical form is singular term/1st-level predi-
cate. Let us therefore apply to it the same test as we applied to uses of 
"something." That is to say, let us consider what questions might legitimately 
be asked in response to "Tom and Mary are what ' ___ is F' stands for." We 
might ask "And what is that?," to which the the answer is simply "F," e.g. 
"insensitive" or "a human being." But here the questioning must end, for 
there can be no answer to "Which human being?" or "Which insensitive?" 
Clearly, therefore, this use of "What ' ___ is F' stands for" involves sec-
ond-level quantification, which means that the proposition "What ' ___ is 
F' stands for is F" is of the same logical form as "Underpaid is what Peter 
does not want to be." The latter is of the form 2nd-level predicate ("under-
paid")/1st-Ievel predicable (" __ is what Peter does not want to be"). Simi-
larly, "What ' ___ is F' stands for is F" is of the form 2nd-level 
predicate("what ' __ is F'stands for")/1 st-Ievel predicable(" __ is F"). 
Furthermore, because the second-level predicate is not " ___ is F" (but 
merely includes that expression), there are no grounds for saying that the one 
expression is being used as a first-level predicable in one place but as as a 
second-level predicate in another. Once the logical form of VaIlicella's ex-
amples is exposed, therefore, they prove not to be examples of self-predica-
tion at all, and hence are not expressions of property self-exemplification 
either. The doctrine of divine simplicity is indeed defensible, but not by 
denying the absolute difference between first-and second-level predicables, 
nor by affirming the possibility of property self-exemplification. 
Logically Simple Propositions 
In addition to taking issue with Vallicella on property self-exemplification, I 
have difficulty with his reasons for rejecting the argument for the possibility 
of propositions that are logically simple in the sense of having no sub-pro-
positional parts. This is the topic he addresses in the Appendix. 
Vallicella is under the impression that my argument for logically simple 
propositions is to be rejected for making a purely grammatical point rather 
than the logical one it purports to make. This, however, is to overlook the 
fact that the argument is not based on the absence of verbal or grammatical 
parts in either of the two main propositions I considered, viz. the German 
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"Es klappert" and the Romanian "Fulgura." On the contrary, it is based on 
the absence of referring expressions. In the case of "Es klappert," although 
the only possible candidate for a referring role was "es," the context showed 
clearly that it did not refer to anything at alP This is not a grammatical point, 
for "referring expression" is not a grammatical category but a logical one. 
So here was one proposition containing no referring expression, nor any other 
logical part either. In the case of "Fulgurii" there was not even a possible 
candidate for a referring role - no pronoun, no suffix, no prefix, nothing at 
all except the verb stem. Again, therefore, we have a proposition with no 
logical parts. Although I do think that other propositions like "Es regnet" or 
"It is raining" are also logically simple, nothing whatever turns on that particular 
claim, for either "Es klappert" on its own or "Fulgura" on its own would have 
sufficed to show that logically simple propositions are not impossible. 
Besides objecting to the argument for logically simple propositions, Val-
licella has difficulty with their truth-value. Indeed, he thinks it is unclear not 
only how those propositions could have any truth-value but also how "any 
intellect like ours could grasp a proposition devoid of logical parts." (p.522) 
This rather puts the cart before the horse, for one thing we do know is that 
Romanians have not the slightest difficulty in knowing the truth-value of 
"Fulgura" (and many other propositions of like form) nor any difficulty in 
grasping it. Similarly in regard to Brentano's use of "Es klappert." Those 
facts cannot be altered by showing that the propositions are logically simple. 
University of New England, Australia 
NOTES 
1. Faith and Philosophy" vol. 9 (1992), pp. 508-25. 
2. M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (London: Duckworth, 1973), pp. 
67-69,214. 
3. Op. cit., p. 216. 
4. Following Geach, I distinguish between a predicable and a predicate. A predicable 
is an expression which merely can be predicated of something; it is a predicate when it is 
predicated of something. Thus, " __ is red" is a predicable in "Whatever is red is 
visible," but a predicate in 'This sports car is red." 
5. "Es klappert" occurs in the sentence "Gross mutter, da ist eine Maus drin! Hort wie 
es klappert! da ist eine Maus drin" (Grandmother, there is a mouse inside! Hark at the 
rattling (or how it rattles)! There is a mouse inside!) in a novel by Clemens Brentano. 
Here the "es," being neuter, cannot refer back to the feminine "eine Maus." Consequently, 
it cannot be a referring expression, but has to be construed as merely a grammatical filler. 
